Constitutional Law—State Action—Debtors and Creditors—Sale of Property Pursuant to Statute and State Action for Purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment—Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975) by McIntyre, Robert J.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1977
Constitutional Law—State Action—Debtors and
Creditors—Sale of Property Pursuant to Statute
and State Action for Purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment—Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802
(9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426
(9th Cir. 1975)
Robert J. McIntyre
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. McIntyre, Constitutional Law—State Action—Debtors and Creditors—Sale of Property Pursuant to Statute and State Action for
Purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment—Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1975), 10 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 465 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol10/iss2/7
RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION-DEBTORS AND CREDITORS-
SALE OF PROPERTY PURSUANT TO STATUTE AND STATE ACTION FOR
PURPOSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Melara v. Kennedy,
541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426
(9th Cir. 1975).
On two recent occasions the Ninth 'Circuit has faced the issue of
whether the private actions of creditors exerting self-help remedies
constitute state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment or
"color of state law" necessary to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
In Culbertson v. Leland,2 a sharply divided court found state action in a
landlord's seizure of a tenant's personal property pursuant to an inn-
keeper's lien law. In Melara v. Kennedy,' however, a unanimous court
held that there was no state action in the extrajudicial sale of property
stored pursuant to a warehouseman's lien. This casenote will explore
the criteria used by the Ninth Circuit to determine whether creditor
remedies provided by a state constitute "significant state involve-
ment,"4 which is essential to trigger due process guarantees of the four-
teenth amendment.
I. THE FACTS OF Culbertson AND Melara
In Culbertson, the plaintiff tenants moved into the defendant's hotel
and agreed to pay rent weekly. After several weeks of regular payment,
they fell one week behind, were evicted and locked out of their room.5
The hotel manager, acting under the authority of the Arizona Innkeep-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Supreme Court established that the
fourteenth amendment was limited to protecting persons against deprivations of liberty
and property by the states. The state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment
and the color of law requirement of section 1983 are often treated as the same thing
and will be so treated in this note. See United States v. Price, 393 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7
(1966).
2. 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975).
3. 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).
4. Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976), citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
5. 528 F.2d at 429. For one judge's interpretation of the significance of the eviction,
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er's Lien Statute, 6 seized the personal possessions7 of the tenants as se-
curity for the unpaid rent. At no time during the course of the land-
lord's actions were any state officials involved.8
In Melara, the plaintiff's home was sold by his conservator and his
possessions were stored with Kennedy Van and Storage. Melara first
became aware of the storage when he received a bill. Refusing to pay
in full, he entered into negotiations with the conservator, the agent of
the buyer of his home, and the warehouse. No payment was made for
four months. In the meantime, Kennedy had sent notice of foreclosure
of the lien and the proposed extrajudicial sale, pursuant to California
Commercial Code section 7210. 9 Melara filed suit alleging that the
proposed sale violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Unlike the Culbertsons, he did not challenge the warehouseman's right
to hold the goods, only the extrajudicial sale.10
I. ANALYSIS OF nH DEcisIONs
The analyses used by the Ninth Circuit in what, at first glance, appear
to be contradictory decisions is indicative of the court's struggle to adapt
the state action concept to the area of private creditor remedies. How-
ever, in viewing these cases together, certain key factors have emerged.
Though far from providing clarity, they at least provide some guidelines
for a case by case determination.
see text accompanying note 28 infra.
6. The Arizona statute is typical of innkeeper lien laws. It gives to inn and apart-
ment house keepers a lien on the baggage and other property of their guests for charges
due, with the right to possession of the property until the charges are paid. ARiz. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. § 33-951 (West 1956). If the property is unclaimed or the charges remain
unpaid for four months, the property may be sold at public auction, with the proceeds
used to satisfy the unpaid charge and the balance going to the owner of the property.
Also contained in the statute are notice provisions. Id. § 33-952.
7. According to the complaint, the items seized included special medicines and foods
for Mrs. Culbertson, who was nearly blind and diabetic, and Mr. Culbertson's prescrip-
tion medicines. 528 F.2d at 434 n.3 (Ely, J., concurring).
8. The manager did call the Phoenix Police Department to ascertain her rights and
was told the seizure was permissible under state law. 528 F.2d at 427.
9. This section provides for the enforcement of the warehouseman's lien which is ac-
quired by section 7209. Section 7210 states in part:
(1) a warehouseman's lien may be enforced by public or private sale of the
goods in bloc or in parcels, at any time or place and on any terms which are com-
mercially reasonable, after notifying all persons known to claim an interest in the
goods.
CAx. COM. CODE ANN. § 7210 (West 1964).
10. 541 F.2d at 803.
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A.' Divergent Views in Culbertson
The wide disparity of opinion in Culbertson is reflective of the
present uncertainty of the courts in defining state action.1 In the lead
opinion, Judge Weigel analyzed the case under the criteria set forth in
the Ninth Circuit's landmark automobile repossession case of Adams v.
Southern California First National Bank12 to determine whether there
was significant state involvement. The first of the three criteria was the
presence or absence of private rights under -the common law. In
Adams, the Ninth Circuit noted that sections 9503 and 9504 of the
11. See Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976) (warehouseman's lien
-no state action); Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975) (innkeeper's
lien-state action); Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (innkeeper's lien-no state action); Davis
v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975) (innkeeper's lien-no state action); Hall v.
Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (landlord lien-state action); Brooks v. Flagg
Bros., 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (warehouseman's lien-no state action);
Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (innkeeper's lien-
state action); Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (landlord lien-
state action); Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (warehouseman's lien-no state action); Adams v. Joseph F. Sanson Invest. Co.,
376 F. Supp. 61 (D. Nev. 1974) (landlord lien-state action); Barber v. Rader, 350 F.
Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (landlord lien-state action); Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp.
823 (D. Neb. 1972) (landlord lien-state action); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338
F. Supp. 390 (N.D. M11. 1972) (innkeeper's lien-state action); Magro v. Lentini Bros.
Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961
(1972) (warehouseman's lien-assuming state action, no due process violation); Kerri-
gan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn. 1971), afrd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 487
(2d Cir. 1971) (innkeeper's lien-no state action); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109
(N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeeper's lien-state action); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co.,
300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973) (innkeeper's lien-state action); Jones v.
Banner Moving & Storage, 358 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1974), modified and aff'd, 369
N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1975) (warehousehan's lien-appellate court holds constitu-
tional decision was premature as lower court failed to discuss state action requirement).
12. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). In Adams,
the Ninth Circuit examined sections 9503 and 9504 of the Uniform Commercial Code
as enacted in California, see note 13 infra, and determined that the actions of creditors
in using self-help to repossess automobiles of delinquent debtors did not constitute action
under color of state law. 492 F.2d at 431. For further comments on repossession un-
der the U.C.C., see generally Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and
Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Burke and Reber]; Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclo-
sure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE.
L. R v. 302 (1972); Clark and Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond. The Creditor
Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973); Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14
Wm. & MARY L. REV. 767 (1973); Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods: Due
Process for the Consumer: What's Due for the Creditor?, 24 CAsE W. Rns. L. REv. 7
(1972); Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost
of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807 (1975).
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Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in California" were merely
codifications of common law rights and therefore, the right of reposses-
sion existed independently of the state statute.' 4  This was not the
situation in Culbertson.
Though historically innkeepers had rights under the common law to
seize a boarder's possessions as security for unpaid charges,"; boarding-
house keepers did not enjoy similar lien rights.' 6 Since Mrs. Leland, the
hotel manager, was not an innkeeper under the common law defini-
tion,17 Judge Weigel concluded that the lien exercised in Culbertson was
purely statutory in nature. Though he warned that this finding was
not "dispositive" of the issue, he concluded that "state action [was]
more likely found where the common law did not permit the ac-
tion .... ,u1
The second criterion was the relationship of the debt owed to the
property seized. 19 In Adams, the car seized was the subject to a spe-
cific security interest. In Culbertson, however, in executing the lien
the manager seized collateral having no relation to the debt owed.20
This broad power of seizure, as distinguished from the narrow power
subject to the written terms of an agreement in repossession cases, was
considered to be a function of the state and a power over which the
state should retain a monopoly.
2'
13. Section 9503 permits a secured party, upon default by the debtor, to take posses-
sion of the collateral. In so doing, judicial process need not be utilized if possession
can be had without breach of the peace. CAL. COM. CODE ANN. § 9503 (West 1964).
Section 9504 provides that a secured party may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the
collateral upon default. Id. § 9504 (West Supp. 1976).
14. 492 F.2d at 330, 333-34.
15. See Hogan, The Innkeeper's Lien at Common Law, 8 HASTINGS L. REv. 33
(1956); Comment, A Proposal for a Constitutional Innkeeper's Lien Statute, 24 Btn-
xrALo L. Rnv. 369, 393 (1975).
16. 528 F.2d at 429.
17. Id. at 431. In Cedar Rapids Inv. Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co., 218 N.W. 510
(Iowa 1928), the court defined an innkeeper as "one who held out his place as one for
the entertainment of all respectable transient persons who chose to come to him." Id.
at 511.
18. 528 F.2d at 431.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The adoption of this view is in conformity with the theory of Judge Kaufman
in Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank of Conn., 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (Kaufman, C.J, dissenting), that the unrestricted non-con-
sensual general seizure of collateral is a power so fraught with danger that the state
should retain a monopoly over it. See also Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th
Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 10
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The third criterion analyzed was the presence or absence of private
contractual remedies. Unlike Adams, where a written contract provid-
ed a private self-help remedy, in Culbertson the sole authority for the
seizure was the statutory lien.2
Judge Ely concurred in Culbertson, but took a more direct route to
finding state action. He viewed the Arizona lien law as a clear delega-
tion of a public function to private individuals.28  He adopted the
principle enunciated in the Fifth Circuit landlord lien case, Hall v.
Garson,2 4 that a state must retain a monopoly over the power to seize
collateral to satisfy a general debt. The Hall opinion had found a clear
analogy between the actions of the landlady and the actions of private
parties in the all-white primary voting cases.25 In both situations, the
parties were performing a traditional state function delegated by the
state. Judge Ely reasoned that since such power was "fraught with
dangers," it must be restrained by the constitutional requirements of
due process of law.26
Judge Choy, in dissent, did not find state action. He summarily
rejected Judge Weigel's analysis27 and distinguished Hall on its facts. In
Hall, the apartment was entered and the television removed prior to any
legal termination of the tenancy. In Culbertson, the manager evicted
the tenants before taking constructive possession of the property. This
distinction, he argued, made Mrs. Leland merely the bailee of the
Culbertsons' belongings.2 It did not, however, clothe her with the
authority of state law.29
Judge Choy interpreted Adams, on which Judge Weigel had relied
for guidelines, as "holding without qualification that a creditor autho-
rized by state law to seize property of his debtor, where this can be
done without a breach of the peace, does not perform a public function
22. 528 F.2d at 432. In Judge Weigel's view, the existence of the statute in Adams
was almost "superfluous." Id.
23. 528 F.2d at 434-35. Judge Ely expressly rejected the distinction between the
common law and the statutory nature of the lien. Id. at 435 n.5.
24. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). Judge Ely found ample support for the public
function test in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946). 528 F.2d at 434, citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
352-53 (1974).
25. 430 F.2d at 439. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (exclusion of black
voters by all-white voting association); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (ex-
clusion of blacks by voter qualifications); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (ex-
clusion of black voters from primaries).
26. 528 F.2d at 433.
27. Id. at 435.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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so as to constitute state action."80 His primary concern lay with an in-
dividual's expectations of residential privacy. 1
The diverse approaches in Culbertson thus provided little guidance
for determining whether state action is present in the area of creditor
remedies. Less than a. year later the court had the chance to speak
again
B. Has Melara Alleviated the Uncertainty?
Melara provided Judge Choy with an opportunity to reassess the state
action question. The factors posited as state action criteria in Culbert-
son served as guideposts.
1. Common Law/Statutory Law Distinction
Judge Choy attempted to lay to rest the common law/statutory law
distinction raised by Judge Weigel in Culbertson as a viable factor in
determining the presence or absence of state action. 82 The conclusion
that this factor was of "dubious worth"' was underscored by the further
assertion that the statute had been in existence for 120 years and had not
been enacted with the intention of providing a way for the state to cir-
cumvent the fourteenth amendment.8 4
In Cdbertson, Judge Weigel had disclaimed full reliance on the fact
that the statute gave the hotel manager a right she would not have had
at common law. 5 However, it was evident from his thorough and
scholarly discussion of the historical basis of landlord liens and his
cursory treatment of the other two factors36 that the distinction carried
great weight. This basis for finding state action has been subject to
criticism, commentators warning that to "make state action turn upon
whether the right being asserted has common law origins [would] lead to
anomalous results."87  Courts, though recognizing the statutory nature
30. Id. at 436. The Melara court also noted that since the seizure and proposed sale
were limited to the goods stored in the warehouse, enforcement would be peaceful. 541
F.2d at 807. It is questionable how breach of the peace could be the dividing line for
state action purposes. The idea comes from U.C.C. § 9503. See note 13 supra.
31. 528 F.2d at 437.
32. 541 F.2d at 805-06. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
33. Id. at 805. In Culbertson, Judge Ely had noted that this factor would lead to ob-
solete distinctions. 528 F.2d at 435 n.5. See Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 203-
04 (lst Cir. 1975).
34. 541 F.2d at 806. See notes 61-70 infra and accompanying text.
35. 528 F.2d at 431.
36. Id. at 431-32. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
37. Burke and Reber, supra note 12, at 47. In full the authors say:
470 [Vol. 10
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of the lien, have felt that this factor -should be given little or no weight
because it is the states functioi ,to continually redefine property rights
and remedies available to credit6rs s.8
2. Consideration of State Action Theories
The Melara court considered key Supreme Court decisions and
modem theories of state action that have developed therefrom. None
proved to be applicable. Both the symbiosis or joint venture theory 9
and the entwinement or regulation theory4" were summarily discarded.
The court did not consider an offshoot of the entwinement theory that
The fact that the law under attack is new and creates, rather than codifies, common
law rights should not change the inquiry. The focus for state action purposes
should always be on the impact of the law upon the private ordering, not the law's
age or historical underpinnings. Unless the law in some fashion significantly inter-
feres with private ordering, the challenged conduct should not be attributed to the
state. To make state action turn upon whether the statutory right being asserted
has common law origins would lead to anomalous results. The identical private
conduct, pursuant to the identical state statutory or judicial law, would be state
action in some states while not in others depending solely upon the fortuitous and
unimportant circumstance of the age and history of the law.
Id.
38." See Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 202-03 (1st Cir.
1975).
39. The leading case under the symbiosis theory is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the Court found the requisite state action in
the relationship between the state-owned garage and the racially discriminatory private
restaurant, which rented space in the structure. Although the Court warned that it did
not have an exact formula to ascertain when state involvement became sufficient to trig-
ger the state action requirement, it held that the state of Maryland had "so far in-
sinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant owner] that it
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. . . ." Id. at 725.
In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), the Court examined the state action
question in the context of state officials and private parties cooperating in civil rights
violations. The court found action under color of state law in the "joint activity" of
the state officials and the private parties. Id. at 794-95.
40. 541 F.2d at 806-07. The entwinement theory primarily arises where a state
agency has heavily involved itself in activities of a private nature through regulation. In
the leading case of Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Court
found that the state issuance of a liquor license to a private club did not constitute state
action and noted that they had "never held. . . that discrimination by an otherwise pri-
vate entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity re-
ceive[d] any sort of benefit or service at all from the State; or [was] subject to state
regulation in any degree whatever." Id. at 173.
Courts have found state action, however, in the public utility field where state agen-
cies regulate extensively. One of the strongest opinions came in Palmer v. Columbia
Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973), wherein the Sixth Circuit found .the,
"operations of the appellant company [were] fully circumscribed by an all encompassing
system of state statutes, city ordinances and the supervision of state regulatory author-
ity . . . " Id. at 165.
The holding in Palmer was undermined by Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
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has often been raised in creditor lien litigation.41  This latter concept,
developed in Reitman v. Mulkey, 42 is based on state involvement
through the passage of legislation which "encourages" an activity pre-
viously forbidden.4 Presumably, it was not discussed in Melara be-
cause the court did not consider it a viable theory with respect to private
creditor remedies since its genesis and development had taken place in
courts facing issues of racial discrimination.44
The Melara court did consider application of the public function
theory, which was applied to creditor remedy cases in the Fifth Cir-
cuit.4 In Culbertson, Judge Ely promoted this theory, reasoning that
the statute which permitted seizure of collateral as security for a debt
was a role historically reserved to the state.46 In Melara, however, the
theory was held to be inapplicable on the facts because the property held
for sale was the very property that created the debt.4 7  Thus, Kennedy
U.S. 345 (1974), which involved a privately-owned utility company licensed by the
Pennsylvania Utility Commission. After examining several theories of state action (in-
cluding the entwinement theory), the Court ruled that the petitioner had failed to show
a sufficient connection between the termination of the utility service, without notice or
hearing, and any action of the state. Though the respondent utility was heavily regu-
lated, the state involvement was not sufficient to constitute state action. Id. at 358-59.
Cf. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
41. See Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Natl Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975); Brooks
v. Flagg Bros., 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109
(N.D. Cal. 1970).
42. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
43. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the people of California, utilizing
the processes of initiative and referendum, had added an amendment to the California
Constitution, the effect of which would have been to allow racial discrimination in pri-
vate housing rental and sale. This action changed prior California law, which had pro-
hibited racial discrimination in housing. The Court found that the state had encouraged
the wrongful activity and had significantly involved itself in the racial discrimination. Id.
44. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
45. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). The public function test finds
state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers which are the traditional
and exclusive reserve of the state. The theory was originally developed to combat racial
discrimination in the voting rights area. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-
02 (1966) (privately-owned municipal park); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70
(1953) (voting rights); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-09 (1946) (freedom of
speech); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659-66 (1944) (voting rights). But see
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970), where the Court refused to find state action
when the park that was the subject of the suit in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966), was returned to the testator's heir by operation of Georgia trust law.
46. 528 F.2d at 433 (Ely, I., concurring).
47. 541 F.2d at 807.
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Van and Storage did not function as if it had a "roving commission:" 4
Also, Kennedy Van and Storage provided notice to the debtor49 and,
because it already had possession of the property, no seizure was neces-
sary
50
Though the Melara court did not-advocate the application of the
public function test,51 neither did it completely reject the test. The legal
merits of the theory were not explored. This was the same position
taken by Judge Choy in Culbertson when he chose to distinguish
Culbertson from Hall v. Garson52 and impliedly leave the public func-
tion test as a viable theory.
8
3. Relationship of the Property to the Debt;
the Existence of a Contract
The key factors in Melara were the existence of a private contractual
remedy and the direct relationship between the debt and property. The
court recognized the special interest that attaches to "goods that act as
. . . collateral."5 Unlike Culbertson, the levy was not a "general and
indiscriminate" one.55 Rather, as in Adams, the enforcement of the lien
was peaceful and limited to goods stored.5 Thus, the dangers that
accompany a "roving commission" were absent.57
Also, in Melara the stored property was the basis of the obligation.5
This was similar to Adams, where a security interest was created by
contract in the specific automobile sold.59 In contrast, the property of
the tenant in Culbertson did not have any direct relationship to the debt
owed for rent.60
These pivotal factors allowed the court to treat a sheriff performing
his public duty differently from a creditor. Stripped down, Melara
holds that where private parties have entered into a written agreement,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 808.
51. The court noted that the theory had never been accepted in the Ninth Circuit.
Id. at 807.
52. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. 528 F.2d at 435, 437.
54. 541 F.2d at 807.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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and the property to be sold without any state involvement actually
created the debt, state action will not be found.
rI. I-STORICAL PERSPECTV
The historical purpose of the fourteenth amendment has been protec-
tion against racial discrimination."' It was primarily in this area that
the Supreme Court expanded the state action concept.62 Though the
Court has not yet provided guidance in the area of creditor remedies, 3 it
is unlikely that the Court would apply the broad reach of state action
used in discrimination cases.
Commentators have urged that creditor remedy cases be distinguished
from racial discrimination cases64 and have endorsed a balancing ap-
proach characteristic of the Burger Court.65 This approach weighs the
extent of governmental participation against the importance of the rights
asserted.66 Application of a "sliding scale" could conceivably result in a
finding that the same act constitutes state action in one context, but not
in another.
The Ninth Circuit was perhaps the first court to discuss directly the
distinction between racial discrimination and creditor remedy cases. In
61. See Burke and Reber, supra note 12, at 4.
62. See cases cited note 45 supra; see also Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
The Supreme Court also expanded the state action concept in the area of first amend-
ment freedoms. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-09 (1946), and Amalgamated
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315-20 (1968), the
Court articulated the theory that in certain instances, private property became the func-
tional equivalent of public property and the actions of private individuals the equivalent
of those of the state. The Logan Valley decision was distinguished and severely under-
mined by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562-67 (1972). In the recent case of
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court made it clear that the func-
tional equivalent test as applied in Logan Valley had been overruled by the subse-
quent decision in Lloyd Corp. Thus, only a factual situation similar to Marsh, however
unlikely, will give rise to the state action concept.
63. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) is an exception. The
Court went into an extensive discussion of state action and concluded that none was
present. In other landmark creditor remedies cases the question of state action was not
discussed because each involved the participation of a state official in the process prior
to seizure. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975)
(court clerk); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (judge); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (court clerk); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (court clerk).
64. See Note, Banker's Lien and Equitable Setoff: Constitutional and Policy Consid-
erations for Protecting Bank Customers, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1155-56 (1975).
65. See Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. Rnv. 840 (1974). But
cf. Comment, Creditors' Remedies: Does The State Help Those Who Help Themselves?,
20 VmL. L. REv. 1035, 1037, 1048-56 (1974-75).
66. See Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840, 863 (1974)..
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Adams v. Southern California First National Bank,"' the court recog-
nized that state action is a jurisdictional question, not a matter of
substantive merit, but it determined that "balancing facts and weighing
circumstances [required] consideration of substantive facts."6  The
court emphasized the clear differences between the enforcement of de-
ficiency claims and the enforcement of racial covenants, 9 and it was
"not convinced that the resolution of the state action question involving
prejudgment self-help repossession of secured property is controlled by
a case involving racial discrimination. 7
0
The absence of Supreme Court guidance has resulted in a lack of
uniformity in the numerous decisions on self-help creditor remedies to
date.71 At first, statutory lien laws were struck down routinely as un-
constitutional. For example, the California innkeeper's lien law was
invalidated in Klim v. Jones,72 where the district court relied heavily on
Reitman v. Mulkey. 5 It emphasized that the statute was the only
authorization for the seizures and the lien statute encouraged the inn-
keeper to act. 74  The court read Reitman as evidence of an increasingly
liberal trend towards finding state action. 75
Since then the Supreme Court has retreated from such an expansive
definition of state action,'76 and the lower courts have begun to reflect the
more restrictive reading. In Davis v. Richmond,77 the First Circuit, in
construing a state lien statute,78 found no state action in a boarding-
67. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
68. Id. at 333 n.23.
69. Id. at 337.
70. Id. at 333. The importance of distinguishing racial discrimination cases from
other civil rights action was more forcefully stated by the Ninth Circuit recently:
[W]hile section 1983 is not limited in application to cases of discrimination by
virtue of race or color, a "less onerous" test [for state involvement] has been
applied to cases involving those ingredients and a "more rigorous" standard applied
for other claims.
Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 542 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1976), citing Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496
F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
71. See note 11 supra.
72. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
73. 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
74. 315 F. Supp. at 114-15.
75. Id. The Court concluded that in light of Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969), the innkeeper lien statute was unconstitutional insofar as it
failed to provide for a hearing prior to imposition of the lien. 315 F. Supp. at 124.
76. See notes 62-66 supra.
77. 512 F.2d 201 (lst Cir. 1975).
78. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 23 (West 1959). The identical statute was
held unconstitutional in Porter v. Fleischhacker, No. 00538 Eq. (Boston Housing Ct.
Jan. 15, 1975).
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house keeper's seizure of a tenant's belongings. 79  The plaintiffs assert-
ed both an encouragement and public function theory, but both argu-
ments were rejected. The court found the fact that the boardinghouse
keeper did not enjoy the lien at common law to be insignificant,8"
reasoning that it was the function of government to regulate property
rights.8 ' The court analogized to the self-help remedies of bankers'
liens82 which had not found state action. Although the court agreed
that the effect of the seizure of a tenant's belongings was similar to the
action of a sheriff, it stated further that to place "reliance on this fact
rather than the extent of state involvement would rob the state action
requirement of any meaning. '8 3
In the same year, the Seventh Circuit in Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan
National Bank"4 ruled that seizure of property by hotelkeepers for non-
payment of rent did not constitute state action.8 5  The court believed
that there was an insufficient nexus between the action of the state in
enacting the statute and the actions of the hotelkeepers to support an
entwinement theory."" The court stated its basic disagreement with the
public function theory, concluding that the execution of a lien "can
hardly be said to be traditionally and exclusively that of the state.
8s7
At most, it was a power shared by both the state and private persons.88
In two district court cases, the challenged sale provisions of ware-
housemen's liens were held not to constitute state action. One New
York case89 went so far as to say that even if there had been no contract
provision for the sale, state action still would not be present.90 A Penn-
sylvania case9 ' analogized to the Third Circuit's auto repossession case,
79. 512 F.2d at 205.
80. Id. at 203.
81. Id. at 204.
S2. Id. at 202, citing Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927
(1st Cir. 1974). The California Supreme Court has also failed to find state action in
upholding the banker's lien in Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d
441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974).
83. 512 F.2d at 205.
84. 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
85. Id. at 157. In so deciding, the circuit court reached an opposite conclusion to that
of an earlier district court dealing with the same Illinois innkeeper lien. See Collins
v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. III. 1972).
86. 527 F.2d at 156. The absence or presence of the lien at common law was deemed
not to have overriding significance but was "one consideration in the mix." Id.
-87. Id. at 157.
88. Id. at 157-58.
89. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
90. Id. at 1066.
91. Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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Gibbs v. Titelman,92 and found no state action.
The Ninth Circuit in Adams was at the forefront of this new trend
and has advanced it in Melara. Was Culbertson therefore an aberra-
tion?
IV. A PROGNOSIS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In recent years a number of different statutory liens have been
tested. 3 Certain key factors have emerged which, if not providing
absolute clarity, at least make it easier to predict how the Ninth Circuit
will rule on the question of state action in the area of self-help creditor
remedies. If the creditor is in possession of the property and there is a
security agreement between contracting parties, then the retention of the
property and subsequent sale to satisfy delinquent debts will probably be
upheld with no state action found. On the other hand, when there
is no contract, no relationship between the property seized and the
debt owed, and the debtor is in possession of the property, the court is
likely to find state action.
In Culbertson, Judge Weigel's statutory law/common law distinc-
tion weighed heavily in determining state action issues. This factor was
rejected by the other two judges, and was completely discarded in
Melara. Thus, at best, its continued vitality is suspect.
The public function test, though never adopted in the Ninth Cir-
cuit,94 may still have viability. In Culbertson, Judge Ely argued that
there was "substantial support in Supreme Court precedent for its
application. . . ."9 In Melara, the theory was held to be inapplicable
92. 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974). Following the lead of the Ninth Circuit in
Adams, all of the circuits and most district courts have found no state action in cases of
auto repossession. See Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v.
Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496
F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 496 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp.
727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972);
Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); cf. Shirley v. State Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Mar-
quette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973). But see Watson v. Branch County
Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank and Trust
Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp.
902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
93. See note 11 supra. For recent California cases interpreting statutory liens, see
Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr.
145 (1974) (garageman's lien); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d
441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (banker's lien).
94. 541 F.2d at 807.
95. 528 F.2d at 434 (Ely, J., concurring). However, only one case is cited, Jackson
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on the facts." In a dissent to the denial of a rehearing en bane in
Adams, Judge Hufstedler argued that the California self-help reposses-
sion laws so involved the state as to constitute state action.17 Although
she was focusing on the heavily regulated automobile-secured credit
industry, Judge Hufstedler cited Hall v. Garson,0 8 the Fifth Circuit's
landlord lien case, for the proposition that the state cannot avoid the
fourteenth amendment by delegating its functions to private creditors 0
Thus, by not closing the door on the public function test, the Ninth
Circuit has left open the option of applying it, at least in cases where
there is a broad and general seizure of personal property having no
relation to the outstanding debt.
V. CONCLUSION
Though one's sympathies lie with the plight of the Culbertsons and
Mr. Melara, courts cannot intervene to protect them from hav-
ing their property taken without due process of law absent a pre-
liminary finding of state action. Such a finding will not be based
solely on the fact that the state by enacting a statute has lent affirmative
support to creditors, 100 unless there is a showing that the statute is in
direct contravention of a goal of the fourteenth amendment.' 0' To hold
otherwise would subject nearly all private activity to the application of
the fourteenth amendment and leave the requirement of state action
meaningless.'0 2
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), where the Supreme Court rejected
the contention that the action of a public utility in shutting off service was really an
action of the state. The wedge left in the door, upon which Judge Ely seized, was lan-
guage indicating that if the utility were exercising some power traditionally assigned to
the state, then that would constitute state action. Because it is grounded in supposition,
this argument is shaky standing alone. Even the court in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430
(5th Cir. 1970), that Judge Ely used as a guidepost in Culbertson, backtracked in the
second opinion to more of an authorization theory. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th
Cir. 1972). There the court stated that the statutory lien in issue "clothes the apartment
operator with clear statutory authority to enter into another's home and seize property
contained therein. This makes his actions those of the State." Id. at 848.
96. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
97. 492 F.2d at 340 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
98. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). See text accompanying notes 24-29, 45-53 supra.
99. 492 F.2d at 342.
100. See Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1976); Culbertson v. Le-
land, 528 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1975); Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l
Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
101. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
102. See Burke and Reber, supra note 12, at 43.
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Absent this showing, the alternatives are numerous. The concept of
state action can be applied broadly or narrowly; it can be tested by a
single theory or combination of factors which add up to state action.
Currently, there is precedent to support every approach, and it is time
for the Supreme Court to lend some guidance. It is probable that the
Court will find no state action when it examines self-help creditor rem-
edies. Taking a cue from the Court, the lower courts are applying a
different standard to non-discrimination cases. If this approach is to
continue it must be constitutionally justified. If the Court declines to
speak, it will be left to the legislatures to insure that adequate pro-
cedures are incorporated into the creditor remedy statutes to protect
debtors from deprivation of their property without due process of law.
Robert J. McIntyre
